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LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Richard D. Schwartz* 
AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESERT, DISPUTES, 
AND DISTRIBUTION. By Richard Lempert and Joseph Sanders. New 
York & London: Longman. 1986. Pp. xiii, 528. Cloth, $39.50; pa-
per, $21.95. 
Professors Lempert and Sanders have written an important book. 
In five creatively cogent chapters, comprising Part I of the work, they 
offer a way to describe legal logic that reaches across all substantive 
fields of law. This discussion is followed by two major efforts at appli-
cation. In Parts II and III, the authors develop and illustrate their 
approach by applying it to the settlement of disputes and the potential 
uses of law as a redistributive mechanism. All three parts are interest-
ing and well-written. 
Part I is more than interesting: it provides a blueprint for the long-
needed bridge between law and the social sciences. In developing and 
illustrating what they call rule and case logics, the authors achieve two 
results. First, they offer an analytic language that lawyers will easily 
understand and that others interested in law can learn. Second, by 
introducing this language they provide a way to interrelate develop-
ments in society with the processes of legal decisionmaking. 
In this review, I will address each of these contributions. In doing 
so, however, I intend to illustrate rather than to describe their ap-
proach and its potential uses. The book itself must be studied by those 
who would use it to maximum advantage. This review is designed 
merely to encourage readers to do so. 
I 
Of greatest importance in developing the connection between law 
and social science is the analytic language that the authors provide. 
The crucial concepts are called rule logic, answering process, and case 
logic. Although these terms are nowhere explicitly defined, their 
meaning is effectively conveyed. 
A rule logic is a highly general legal principle which specifies the 
elements that, in a given legal domain, are prerequisites for legal liabil-
ity. In the example Lempert and Sanders offer, the intent of the actor 
controls legal liability in particular areas of law but is irrelevant in 
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others. One obvious contrast is found within criminal law, between 
common-law offenses mostly characterized as ma/a in se and those 
ma/a prohibita offenses, typically regulatory, which require no show-
ing of intention. Intent is also an important element in contract law, 
which rests on the assumption that the essence of a contract inheres in 
the shared understanding of the contracting parties. By contrast, lia-
bility may be imposed on a tortfeasor in the absence of an intention to 
act toward the end of doing damage - failure to exercise reasonable 
care being sufficient. Thus, in contracts and common-law crimes, the 
intention of the actor is closely scrutinized, while in regulatory of-
fenses and garden-variety torts it is not. 
Similarly, the presence of an available alternative or "ability to do 
otherwise" enters differently in the rule logics of these classes of of-
fenses. For ma/um in se offenses, the rule logic pays heed to the ab-
sence of alternatives. This consideration may enter in the prima facie 
case, as in the definition of the act. For example, automatism, if estab-
lished, precludes a physical movement from being construed as a vol-
untary act; or where an individual is picked up and thrown physically, 
the individual becomes the instrument rather than the agent of an ac-
tion. The same principle applies in torts where liability is generally 
not imposed if the actor could not avoid the action no matter how 
prudent or imprudent the actor. By contrast, the ability to do other-
wise is less significant in the case of contract. While that principle has 
its limits - e.g., in an act of God - its general application is attested 
to by the significance of that phrase, which conveys the meaning of an 
extraordinary circumstance so bizarre as to permit the exception with-
out undercutting the rule. 
For each of these rule logics, one expects to find categories of an-
swers. Here the authors begin to specify some of the psychological 
properties that support the original rule logic, and outline the concept 
of the answering process. In each rule logic, the dynamic is rooted in 
the human tendency to generalize across a range of similar but not 
identical events. So fundamental is this tendency that it is noted in the 
thoughtful observations of young children described originally by Jean 
Piaget. Thus the capacity for "matching" identical objects is extended 
to "pairing" where the similarities are more limited, to "grouping" 
where different elements are abstracted to achieve a common status. 
In legal thought, all three modes of categorizing are infused with nor-
mative significance - maltj.ng Piaget's work on moral judgment par-
ticularly relevant to the legal logics. In the answering process, a range 
of categories begins to emerge which establish themselves by their rele-
vance to the rule logic. These answering categories vary in their fre-
quency. If a characteristic that precludes responsibility is found very 
commonly, it may be regularized either in a modification of the rule 
itself or as part of a well-developed exception to the rule which typi-
cally takes the form of an affirmative defense. If the distinctive char-
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acteristic approaches the status of unique, however, it is likely to 
require justification in terms of a precise precedent with whose facts it 
is virtually identical (i.e., "on all fours") or an original policy-oriented 
argument that seeks to relate the unique facts to the rule logic. 
Lempert and Sanders proceed from this general level to discuss the 
degree of attention paid to the distinctive characteristics of an individ-
ual case. The terms they use to describe these degrees are "deep case 
logic" and "shallow case logic." Deep case logic depends on detailed 
information about the case; a shallow case logic tends to assimilate the 
case into a large set of cases, ignoring the distinctive differences among 
them. 
In practice, law operates somewhere between these two extremes. 
A perfectly deep case logic would find the individual case utterly 
unique. Incomparable to any other case, judgment would in principle 
have to depend on the reaction of the decisionmaker to the entire 
unique combination of facts revealed in the deep case description. To 
the extent that cases are compared, and like cases treated alike, 
Lempert and Sanders' case logic becomes more shallow, i.e., some dis-
tinctive differences are disregarded as irrelevant to the outcome. At 
the extreme, a perfectly shallow case logic would treat all cases alike, 
disregarding every distinctive aspect. The Queen of Hearts, in Lewis 
Carroll's classic, illustrates the most shallow possible logic when she 
calls for judgment before hearing the facts. "First the sentence," she 
cries, "then the verdict." 
Current legal thinking does not accept either of these extremes. In 
fact, the law is full of distinctions that make a difference. But the law 
also insists, in principle, on like cases being treated alike. Differentia-
tions that are not generally supposed to be considered - such as the 
race of the parties - are resisted as legitimate bases of differentiation 
or admitted only after strict scrutiny. 
II 
The relationship between rule and case logics plays a central role 
in legal development. As new kinds of behavior become subject to 
legal control, for example, the tendency is to apply established rule 
logics to determine liability. Whether that application requires a spe-
cific legislative act or is the product of judge-made law, its acceptabil-
ity to those who make and interpret the law is affected by the 
compatibility between the decision and the rule logic of the legal area 
into which the case fits. But rule logics are themselves not immune 
from change. In the system of thought proposed by the authors, two 
dynamics of change in rule logic are suggested: internal and external. 
Internal processes of legal change can be nicely described in terms 
of rule and case logic interaction. As cases arise in which rule logics 
lead to awkward case results, there is a tendency for doctrines to de-
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velop that distinguish a new category. Thus, a deeper case logic will 
be used to distinguish those characteristics that, if ignored, will seem 
to produce anomalous results. The characteristic intralegal system re-
sponse is to enunciate a new doctrine that categorizes the anomalous 
cases and provides in those cases a different result. A familiar example 
is found in the limitation of liability of the employer (under respondeat 
superior) in the event that the co-worker has behaved negligently. But 
the "fellow servant" rule itself came to be subject to a set of expecta-
tions such as these: Where the fellow servant as "vice principal" had 
some authority over the injured worker, where the negligent co-
worker was not employed in the same department, and where the em-
ployer assumed certain nondelegable duties to insure the safety of its 
workers. 
The process of internal doctrinal elaboration may be interpreted as 
a way of protecting the basic rule logic. In the example cited above, 
some responsibility for the employee's safety continues to be attributed 
to the employer, at least in principle. But the principle is maintained 
only at the cost of a whole series of compromises that leave the law 
floundering in deep and deeper case logics, approaching the point 
where the outcome in any given case is increasingly likely to be deter-
mined not by the law and the facts but by the skill of opposing coun-
sel, the willingness of the parties to settle, the disposition of the 
appellate bench, and so forth. As the applicable law becomes more 
complex, its value as a predictor of outcomes declines. With the lack 
of predictability, case law comes to be seen as incapable of successfully 
expressing the rule logic of employer responsibility originally enunci-
ated in the doctrine of respondeat superior. The answer is eventually 
found through worker compensation legislation which radically alters 
the traditional rule logic by awarding compensation for injury under 
procedures that virtually eliminate considerations of fault. 
These changes can be interpreted quite differently. Whereas the 
first approach emphasizes the internal dynamic of the legal process -
in which predictable decisions become ever less possible- the second 
interpretation views the shift to workers' compensation as a product of 
extralegal changes in the society, affecting the legal system in several 
ways. This externalist approach emphasizes the concomitants of in-
dustrialization (including the drive of corporations toward predictabil-
ity of costs), the growth of the labor movement, and the political 
pressure arising from populist and progressive politics. These develop-
ments created forces that unsettled traditional conceptions of responsi-
bility and set loose political forces that created an incentive to move 
the problem of employee injuries out of the courts, and into a regula-
tory mechanism that would minimize company losses through risk 
spreading, while ensuring an injury-related compensatory award to 
most injured workers. 
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In much writing on law and society, there has been a tendency to 
favor the externalist approach illustrated in the second mode of inter-
pretation. This tendency arises in reaction to the extreme internalist 
legal position that treats law as a self-contained system, a seamless web 
that carries within itself a dynamic of its own. This view, expressed in 
John Austin's jurisprudence, has been continued in subtler form by 
Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Dworkin. By contrast, American jurispru-
dence has generally been alert to the external forces that have affected 
law - some of the most cogent formulations coming from such schol-
ars as Holmes, John Chipman Gray, Llewellyn, Fuller, and Hurst. By 
now, we have developed a substantial company of academic lawyers 
and social scientists who take as their principal task the tracing of the 
connections between external societal developments and legal 
responses. 
What has been needed in this effort, more than any other single 
element, is a way of tying together the internalist and externalist ap-
proaches. Internalists are properly attentive to the interrelation of 
rule and case logics. In the glacial development of legal doctrine, the 
impressive fact is the steadiness of the system. Rule logics are not 
readily altered in the work of the courts, nor do judges accept without 
hesitation rule-logical changes in enacted statutory law. The rule logic 
of Anglo-American jurisprudence finds a supplementary source of jus-
tification in the Constitution, beyond the common law tradition which 
was its matrix. The stability of our rule logic is expressed and rein-
forced by the "steadying factors" insightfully described by Karl Llew-
ellyn in The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals. These 
include the conditioning of legal training, the limitation and sharpen-
ing of issues, and the tempering effect of a multi-judge appellate bench. 
Thus, a Robert Jackson takes the occasion on behalf of a unanimous 
court to reverse Morissette's conviction (342 U.S. 246), lest the rule 
logic of intentionality be further diminished through the encroach-
ment of strict liability into areas traditionally requiring intent. The 
conservatism thus shown is not to be taken lightly. It gives stability to 
the society; it embodies the central tenets of our social and moral or-
der; it is the armature around which the society is built. 
When a normative structure is so strongly set in place, can it be 
changed? One of the important issues for law and social science is 
whether and how case-logical changes contribute to change in rule 
logics. Before this question can be examined systematically, we need 
clearer definitions of the two terms. But even with the definitions we 
have, it seems clear that many case-logical changes serve merely to 
stabilize and reaffirm rule-logical principles. The development of lia-
bility to a remote purchaser, for example, traced by Edward H. Levi in 
his Introduction to Legal Reasoning did not alter the rule logic of tort 
law but only extended it by a common-law process from Winterbottom 
v. Wright, where the manufacturer was insulated, to McPherson v. Bu-
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ick, where he was not. If a change in rule logic is to occur - as in the 
workers' compensation example - it seems likely to require not only a 
shift in case logics but also an impetus from the political and economic 
side of the society. 
That does not mean, however, that the externalist can afford to 
ignore the internal legal process. Whatever the origins and direction 
of legal change, it can only be implemented in a limited number of 
ways. The court system, with its balance of rule and case logics, pro-
vides one of the most important devices for expressing and implement-
ing society's values. Alternatively, the courts may resist and deflect 
the expression and implementation of society's values. When the rela-
tionship between rule and case logics falters - as it may by virtue of 
untimely or erratic judicial decisionmaking - the rule logic may lose 
its vitality, or it may be better able to function for having lightened its 
burden. In other words, we do not yet know, in Pound's phrase, the 
"limits of effective legal action." 
Questions of this kind can now be well addressed, by lawyers and 
social scientists, with the help of the new language provided by 
Lempert and Sanders. Their book is perhaps the best contribution 
thus far to the task of integrating internalist and externalist ap-
proaches to legal change, because the book describes law from the in-
side, in ways understandable both to those who study and practice law 
and to those who want to study it as a product of external forces. As a 
result, lawyers and social scientists may be able to understand each 
other better and to cooperate in shaping law as a more effective instru-
ment for attaining societal ends. While there is still a long way to go, 
the authors have given us an invitation to law and social science. It is 
an invitation which I hope many scholars will find worthy of 
acceptance. 
